THE JUDAISM OF HITLER
By G. K. CHESTERTON

Hitlerism is almost entirely of Jewish origin. This truth, if inscribed in the noble old German lettering on a large banner and lifted in sight of an excited mob in a modern German town, might or might not have the soothing effect which I desire. This simple historical explanation, if written on a post-card or a telegraph-form, and addressed to Herr Hitler's private address, might or might not cause him to pause in his political career, and reconsider all human history in the light of the blazing illumination, with which I have furnished him in these words.

Finally, these words, placed even where they stand at the beginning of this paragraph, may not be wholly comprehended or connected with their true historical origins; but they are none the less strictly historical.

It is a horrible shame to say I was ever unkind to a Nordic Man. I have had many of these innocent creatures of God gambolling round my house from time to time, and I have always found them faithful and affable; when treated and trusted, as they should be, with faith and affection. I am very fond of the real Nordic Man, especially when he does really look like a Nordic Man; as, for example, when he is a Scandinavian. I think the Scandinavian is a thoroughly nice fellow; and probably a much better man than I. Hitler does not look in the least like a Nordic Man; but that is another question, and need not discredit his personal good qualities. But, when it comes to the reading of history, there is one thing that I can never for the life of me see. I can easily believe that a nice large Scandinavian may have brought great elements of strength or simplicity into any family into which he married; and what is true of the Scandinavian may be quite true of the German. But what I frankly and flatly deny, in history as a whole, is that any Nordic Men ever brought anything in the way of an idea into the world. The Germans came in due course to describe their piracy as imperialism; but they borrowed the idea of imperialism from the Romans. They produced a sort of Prussianism that was praised or blamed as militarism; but they borrowed the idea of militarism from the French. The German Emperors modelled themselves on the Austrian Emperors, who had modelled themselves on the Greek Emperors and the Roman Emperors. The greatest of the Prussians did not even conceal his contempt for Prussia. He refused to talk anything but French, or to exchange ideas with anybody, except somebody of the type of Voltaire. Then came the liberal ideas of the French Revolution, and the whole movement of German Unity was originally a liberal movement on the lines of the French Revolution. Then came the more modern and much more mortally dangerous idea of Race, which the Germans borrowed from a Frenchman named Gobineau. And on top of that idea of Race, came the grand, imperial, and insane idea of a Chosen Race, of a sacred seed that is, as the Kaiser said, the salt of the earth; of a people that is God's favourite and guided by him, in a sense in which he does not guide other and lesser peoples. And if anybody asks where anybody got that idea, there is only one possible or conceivable answer. He got it from the Jews.

It is perfectly true that the Jews have been very powerful in Germany. It is only just to Hitler to say that they have been too powerful in Germany. The Germans will find it very hard to cut up their culture on a principle of Anti-Semitism amputation. They will find it difficult to persuade any German, let alone any European who is fond of Germany, that Schiller is a poet and Heine is not; that Goethe is a critic and Lessing is not; that Beethoven is a composer and Mendelssohn is not; that Bach is a musician and Brahms is not. But again, it is but just to Hitler to say that the Jews did infect Germany with a good many things less harmless than the lyrics of Heine or the melodies of Mendelssohn. It is true that many Jews toiled at that obscure conspiracy against Christendom, which some of them can never abandon; and sometimes it was marked not by obscurity but obscenity. It is true that they were financiers, or in other words usurers; it is true that they fattened on the worst forms of Capitalism; and it is inevitable that, on losing these advantages of Capitalism, they naturally took refuge in its other form, which is Communism. For both Capitalism and Communism rest on the same idea: a centralisation of wealth which destroys private property. But among the thousand and one ways in which Semitism affected Germanism is in this mystical idea, which came through Protestantism. Here the Nordic Men, who are never thinkers, were entirely at the mercy of the Jews, who are always thinkers. When the Reformation had rent away the more Nordic sort of German from the old idea of human fellowship in a Faith open to all, they obviously needed some other idea that would at least look equally large and towering and transcendent. They began to get it through the passionate devotion of historical Protestants to the Old Testament. That, of course, is where the joke comes in; that the Protestants now wish to select for destruction what nobody else except the Protestants had ever wanted to select and set apart for idolatry. But that is a later stage of the story. By concentrating on the counter-weight of the idea of the universal Church of Christendom, they grew more and more into the mood of seeing their religion as a mystical religion of Race. And then, by the same modern processes, their education fell into the hands of the Jews. There are Jewish mystics and Jewish sceptics; but about this one matter of the strange sacredness of his own race, almost every Jewish sceptic is a Jewish mystic. When they inculcated their ideals into German culture, they doubtless very often acted, not only as sceptics, but as cynics. But, even if they were only sceptics.
Why We Dislike Controversy
By Arnold Lunn

As a nation we tend to dislike controversy, particularly in religious matters, a dislike which is due to our national distrust of logic. Our faith in the value of controversy as a means of arriving at the truth, naturally depends on our faith in the power of logic to draw correct conclusions from given premises.

Our mediæval ancestors believed in controversy because they believed in reason. "It is necessary," wrote St. Thomas Aquinas, "to dispute in public about the Faith provided there be those who are equal and adapted to the task of confuting error, since in this way people are strengthened in the Faith, and unbelievers are deprived of the opportunity to speak, while if those who ought to withstand the perverters of truth are silent, this would tend to strengthen error."

Our mediæval forefathers not only believed in controversy but they also regarded with profound respect the great controversiasts. Indeed, a champion controversiast enjoyed in the Middle Ages much the same prestige as a champion golfer enjoys to-day.

The distrust of controversy dates from the Reformation. Luther's famous slogan, "Justification by Faith," was nominally aimed at those supposed to believe in "Justification by Words," but was, in effect, an attack on the Catholics who believed in justification by reason.

"The dreary syllogisms of the scholastics," said Luther in effect, "lead nowhere. Religion begins not in the brain but in the heart. Don't argue, just feel, and go on feeling..."

I believe that our national distrust of logic is derived from the fact that Protestantism is illogical. There must be something wrong, we feel, about a mode of reasoning which seems to lead to Rome. Though we no longer realise why we distrust logic, for most Englishmen to-day are only Protestants so far as they are not Catholics; the old distrust still remains, and finds expression in phrases which are part and parcel with our national philosophy. Let me ask the reader's indulgence while I examine three such phrases.

It may be true in theory, but it does not work out in practice. If it does not work out in practice it is not true in theory. The theory which does not bear the test of practice should be either revised or rejected.

You can prove anything from statistics. No, you can't. If the statistics are accurate and the argument which is based on the statistics is logical, the conclusion will be true. The conclusion will be false (a) if the statistics are incorrect, (b) if they are incomplete, and (c) if you have ignored other factors which modify the deductions drawn from the statistics.

A mere debating point. Why "mere"? Is an argument to be suspect merely because it is effective in debate? The "mere debating point" is either effective or ineffective. If ineffective, it is not a debating point, but a debating lapse. If it is effective, it is effective either because the argument is sound, or because the opposition are too stupid to refute an unsound argument.

No mediæval thinker would have understood the phrase, "a mere debating point." A debating point, he would have urged in his bewildermest, is either good or bad. It is meaningless to describe it as "mere."

The ardent controversiast, as I know full well, is an object of suspicion in modern England, not only because we doubt of the value of controversy, but because foolish people equate the controversial with the quarrelsome. I have been involved in many controversies, and have enjoyed them all, controversies about Public Schools, skiing controversies, controversies with the Norwegians, and religious controversy. All great fun. But though I have crossed swords with many people, I do not think I have made any enemies in my controversies. I do not see why controversy should develop into a personal quarrel. Chess is a form of controversy, but chess tournaments seldom degenerate into personal brawls. Nor can I see why hard hitting should be a virtue in a controversy between two boxers, and a vice in a controversy between two Christians.

I have noticed, however, that those who deplore Catholic attacks on Modernists lodge no protest when the Modernist attacks the Catholic.

I respect Bishop Barnes. He is logical enough to realise that the Catholic Church is either a divine institution or a dangerous fraud. He believes the Church to be a fraud, and he has the courage to say so. I think it is rather feeble for Catholics to complain that their feelings have been hurt by the vigour of his attacks. It is still more feeble for a Modernist to whine when Catholics hit back.

Hard hitting need not imply personal bitterness. A controversy need not be acrimonious because it is uncompromising in its vigour. Contempt for hereby
pretending to be mystics, they could only pretend to understand one kind of mysticism. Thus, German mysticism became more and more like Jewish mysticism: a thing not thinking much of ordinary human beings, the hewers of wood and drawers of water, the Gentiles or the strangers; but thinking with intense imagination of the idea of a holy house or family, alone dedicated to heaven and therefore to triumph. This is the great Prussian illusion of pride, for which thousands of Jews have recently been rabbled or ruined or driven from their homes. I am certainly not enough of an Anti-Semite to say that it served them right.

But it is true that it all began with the power of the Jews; which has now ended with the persecution of the Jews. People like the Hitlerites never had any ideas of their own; they got this idea indirectly through the Protestants, that is primarily through the Prussians; but they got it originally from the Jews. In the Jews it has even a certain tragic grandeur; as of men separated and sealed and waiting for a unique destiny. But until we have utterly destroyed it among Christians, we shall never restore Christendom.

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